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V

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme
Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Cheryl, Inc. 's
Motion for Revision of the Decision Denying Summary Judgment. The standard of review
on summary judgment issues is de novo. See Innerlight v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31,
H 8, 214 P.3d 854. In the alternative, appellant Cheryl, Inc. submits that the district court
entered judgment based on an inconsistent verdict. Therefore, the Court should order a new
trial. See Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Appellant Cheryl, Inc. believes that interpretation of the following may be
determinative of portions of this appeal.
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
•

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a personal injury case wherein plaintiff/appellee Teresa Guss was injured after
receiving cosmetic services from defendant/appellant Cheryl, Inc. ("Cheryl"). After Ms.
Guss had finished her treatment with Cheryl, Inc., defendant Derek Edvalson ("Derek"), the
adult son of Cheryl Edvalson (the owner of Cheryl, Inc.), assisted Ms. Guss to her vehicle.
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Ms. Edvalson did not assist Ms. Guss into her vehicle, nor did any employee assist Ms. Guss.
As Derek assisted Ms. Guss into her vehicle, Ms. Guss sustained injuries. Thereafter Ms.
Guss sued Cheryl, Inc. and Derek for negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cheryl Edvalson is the owner of defendant Cheryl, which is a twenty-one-year-old
skin care business that provides facials and waxing treatments. (Trial Transcript ("TT")
138:2-11; 169:9-15; 172:11-13). Cheryl ran the business out of her home (TT 382:5-8),
which is located at 5276 Morning Sky Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. (TT 145:17-21). During
March 2004, Ms. Edvalson, on behalf of Cheryl, employed three individuals - Julie
Henrickson, Jill Fuller-Neiber, and Natalie Fuller - on a part-time basis. (TT 138:7-11).
Derek Edvalson is the son of Ms. Edvalson and, during March 2004, he was 21 years
old and living at home. (TT 378:25-379:15). At that time, he attended school at Salt Lake
Community College. (TT 168:19-22; 381:11-14). Occasionally, his mother would ask him
to bring in a heavy box, mow the lawn, shovel the driveway, or something of that nature.
(TT 177:20-25). At no time, however, was Derek employed by Cheryl. (TT 177:8-15;
383:3-5).
Ms. Edvalson became acquainted with Ms. Guss when Ms. Guss began receiving
facial treatments in 2001. (TT 176:7-12; 82:17-23). Ms. Guss is a paraplegic and is confined
to a wheelchair. (Record ("R.") 305 P ; TT 79:18-80:13). When Ms. Guss would come to
Cheryl for facial treatments, she would have someone carry her from her car to the inside,
because there were steps going into the home. (TT 83:2-84:11). In the beginning, Ms.
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Guss's boyfriend or a friend would bring Ms. Guss to Cheryl and carry her in so she could
receive her treatment. (TT 83:9-10; 140:7-17). Then, Ms. Guss would call Cheryl upon her
arrival, and at Ms. Guss's request, Ms. Edvalson and one of Ms. Edvalson's employees
would go out to meet her and carry her inside. (TT 178:10-13). On a few occasions, Derek
offered to carry Ms. Guss. (TT 84:12-19; 123:1-7; 383:19-25).
On March 12,2004, Ms. Edvalson had a movable ramp installed over the stairs on the
front of her home. (TT 141:8-12; 143:1-3). Ms. Edvalson had this done, in part, so it would
be easier for Ms. Guss to enter and leave the premises. (TT 141:8-25). On that day, Ms.
Guss received a facial treatment from Cheryl. (TT 99:10-14).
At the time that Ms. Guss was receiving her facial treatment, Derek came home after
he had been at school. (TT 385:14-387:4). As Derek arrived, he saw Ms. Guss (TT 389:3-6)
and then he proceeded to eat lunch and watch TV. (TT 389:17-20).
Upon Ms. Edvalson's request to her son that he help Ms. Guss out to her car (TT
151:16-17; 152:9-11; 389:20-25), Derek offered to help Ms. Guss out to her car. (TT 390:36). Derek proceeded to help Ms. Guss by holding on to the back of her wheelchair, and by
slowly pushing her down the ramp (TT 152:23-24; 390:15-18). When the two of them
reached Ms. Guss's car, which was parked in the driveway, Ms. Edvalson opened up the left
driver's side door of Ms. Guss's vehicle, a Subaru. (TT 150:4-5; 392:1-7).
At that point, Derek lifted Ms. Guss's wheelchair approximately one-quarter to onehalf inch so Ms. Guss could get into the seat of her car. (TT 95:22-24; 392:8-11; 398:5-22).
Ms. Guss instructed Derek by saying, "Up, up, up!" (TT 159:3-8; 392:12-13). Ms. Guss
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began sliding forward (TT 154:20-24), and although there is somewhat conflicting testimony
about what exactly happened next, Derek either grabbed onto the wheels of the wheelchair
(TT 165:20-24; 96:8-13) or he reached for Ms. Guss's armpits to support her (TT 155:3-4;
183:20-22). Then Ms. Guss fell and hit her shins and knees on the driveway. (R. 305 ^ 8; TT
96:14-21; 392:21-393:1).
As a result of Ms. Guss's fall, she sustained injuries. (R. 306 % 10; TT 99-105).
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 6, 2006, Ms. Guss filed a Complaint against Cheryl. (R. 1-6). Then, on
January 16, 2007, Ms. Guss filed a First Amended Complaint against Cheryl and Derek for
negligence. (R. 36-42). In the First Amended Complaint, Ms. Guss alleged:
8.
The Plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition,
was leaving the premises of the Defendant, Cheryl, Inc., when Defendant
Derek Edvalson, acting for and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc., attempted to
pick up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle. While
raising [sic] wheelchair off of the ground, the wheelchair rotated and the
Plaintiff was dropped onto the concrete driveway below, sustaining the injuries
alleged herein.
(R. 37 T| 8) (emphasis added). Ms. Guss's allegation that she was injured when Derek lifted
the wheelchair is the only act that Ms. Guss alleges caused her injuries. (See R. 36-42).
On March 9, 2007, Cheryl filed a motion for summary judgment (the "Summary
Judgment Motion"), arguing that it could not be held vicariously liable for Ms. Guss's
injuries, because Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. (R. 52-152). On May 21,2007, the
district court held a hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 925; Hearing
Transcript ("HT") 1-11) (a copy of the transcript from the hearing is attached hereto as
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Exhibit A). At the hearing, Cheryl argued that the evidence showed that Derek was not an
employee of Cheryl, and therefore, Cheryl could not be held liable. (HT 3:18-5:8). Ms. Guss
argued that to the contrary, there was an issue of fact concerning whether there was an
agency relationship between Cheryl and Derek. (HT 7:14-9:3).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment
Motion, and stated: "I believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine
whether or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the
business should be liable or could be liable. I'll therefore deny the motion for summary
judgment." (HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court held
that whether an agency relationship existed between Cheryl and Derek was a question of fact
for the jury to decide.
On April 1, 2008, Ms. Guss filed a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 304-07). The
Second Amended Complaint added a cause of action against Derek, but it added no new
claims or allegations against Cheryl. (R. 304-07).
A four-day jury trial was held, beginning on March 2, 2009. (R. 810-11; 812A-815;
855). Approximately one week before the trial, Ms. Guss settled her case against Derek.
(See R. 812-13).
At the trial, the jury was presented with the following factual issues: (1) whether
Derek was negligent; and (2) whether Derek was a volunteer or an employee of Cheryl. Ms.
Edvalson testified that Derek had never been an employee of Cheryl, nor had he ever
provided facial treatments. (TT 177:8-15). Ms. Edvalson testified that occasionally, she
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would ask her son to carry in to the house a heavy box or to shovel the driveway. (TT
177:17-25). Furthermore, Derek testified that he had never been an employee of Cheryl, nor
had he ever been paid by Ms. Guss to help her up the stairs when Ms. Guss would come for
her treatments. (TT 383:3-5; 385:8-10). He testified that he was simply "willing to help
people in need." (TT 385:12-13).
After the conclusion of the presentation of witnesses at trial, the district court
discussed with counsel each of the jury instructions and the Special Verdict form that he
intended to give to the jury. (TT 467:5-471:6; 475:8-477:24). Cheryl had submitted
proposed jury instructions and a proposed Special Verdict form approximately one week
prior to the trial. (R. 676-749). The Record does not show that Ms. Guss submitted any jury
instructions or a Special Verdict form. After the district court discussed with counsel the jury
instructions (some of which were submitted by Cheryl (R. 676-749) and the rest of which
were added by the district court) and Special Verdict form, the district court asked whether
counsel had any objections, and counsel for Ms. Guss did not have any objections. (TT
477:20-21).
After the district court recited the jury instructions to the jury, counsel made their
closing arguments. (TT 499-534). In Cheryl's counsel's closing argument, Cheryl said that
if the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, then Cheryl could not be held liable. (TT 529:413). Ms. Guss's counsel did not object to the statement in the closing argument and the
district court did not offer a curative instruction.
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On March 12, 2009, the jury rendered its Special Verdict and answered seven
Interrogatories in the Special Verdict. (R. 865-67) (a copy of the Special Verdict is attached
hereto as Exhibit B). The jury found that Derek was a volunteer in Interrogatory No. 6,
which provided as follows:
Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer.
Employee
Volunteer
X
(R. 866-67 T| 6). The jury, however, distributed the percentage of negligence among the
following:
A.
B.

Defendant, Cheryl, Inc.
Defendant, Derek Edvalson

42
20

%
%

C.

Plaintiff, Teresa Guss

38

%

(R. 866 H 5; see Exhibit B).
Subsequently, on March 16, 2009, Cheryl filed a motion for the revision of the
decision denying summary judgment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)1 (the
"Rule 54(b) Motion"). (R. 856-58). In the Rule 54(b) Motion, Cheryl argued that the issue
of whether Derek was a volunteer or an employee had been resolved by the jury (R. 861 -64),
1

In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit D, this Court stated that "Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . allows a court to change its position with respect to any order or
decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Id. at 1310 n.2 (citing Timm
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). The Court noted that "a motion
under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider its prior denial of a motion
for summary judgment." Id. at 1311 (citing Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85; James Constructors,
761P.2dat44n. 5).
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and, because the district court had denied its Summary Judgment Motion solely on the basis
that there was a factual issue on this point, the district court should reverse its earlier denial
of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 861-64).
Ms. Guss responded to the Rule 54(b) Motion by arguing, for the first time, that
Cheryl was independently negligent. (R. 886-87). In a one-page Minute Entry dated June
1, 2009, the Court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion based on the following: "The Jury
may have inferred from the evidence and a review of the Verdict Form that liability could
be assessed against CHERYL, INC. independent of the status of Derek Edvalson." (R. 926)
(emphasis added) (a copy of the Minute Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit C). Thus, the
Court reconciled the inconsistent verdict by surmising that Cheryl's liability could be based
on a theory of independent negligence.
Judgment was ultimately entered against Cheryl on June 17, 2009. (R. 929-31).
After Cheryl filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 940-41), Ms. Guss filed a motion for
summary disposition, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
arguing that the jury found Cheryl independently negligent, which rendered the vicarious
issue "irrelevant and insubstantial." This Court denied Ms. Guss's motion for summary
disposition on September 3, 2009.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Guss brought this lawsuit against Cheryl and Derek, after she sustained injuries
when Derek was helping her into her car after she had received a facial treatment from
Cheryl. Ms. Guss pleaded a claim for vicarious liability. The district court held a hearing
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on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, in which Cheryl argued that Derek was not an
employee of Cheryl and therefore, it could not be held vicariously liable for the torts of
Derek. The district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion on the ground that
there existed an issue of fact concerning whether there was an employment relationship
between Cheryl and Derek.
After a jury trial, the jury rendered its Special Verdict and found that Derek was not
an employee of Cheryl, but was merely a volunteer offering to assist Ms. Guss to her car.
The jury, however, apportioned fault against Cheryl. As a result, Cheryl filed a Rule 54(b)
Motion, arguing that the factual finding that Derek was a volunteer presented a "different
light" or "different circumstances," by which the district court should reverse its denial of
Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. In response to the motion, Ms. Guss argued that the
jury found Cheryl independently negligent. The district court did not necessarily agree with
Ms. Guss, but stated that the jury, after reviewing the evidence and the Special Verdict form,
may have inferred that liability could be assessed against Cheryl. On that basis, the district
court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion and entered judgment against Cheryl. The district
court essentially ignored the jury's finding that Derek was a volunteer, and declined to give
it any legal effect.
Cheryl respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of
Cheryl's 54(b) Motion, or in the alternative, order a new trial, as set forth in greater detail
below.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE JURY'S FINDING THAT DEREK WAS A VOLUNTEER
PRECLUDES MS. GUSS FROM RECOVERING AGAINST CHERYL
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In this lawsuit, Ms. Guss sought recovery against Cheryl on the theory that Cheryl was

the employer of Derek (the adult son of the owner of Cheryl), and therefore, Cheryl should
be held liable for Derek's negligence. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, Cheryl can
only be held liable if it employed Derek. Because the jury found that Derek was not an
employee of Cheryl, but that he was a mere volunteer that offered to help Ms. Guss, Cheryl
cannot be held liable for Derek's negligence.
A.

Under the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability an Employer
Cannot Be Held Liable for a Volunteer's Negligent Acts

It is well-settled law that an employer cannot be held liable for a tortfeasor's
negligence unless the tortfeasor is an employee, and the tortfeasor was acting within the
scope of employment during the time the tort was committed. See, e.g., Glover v. Boy Scouts
of America, 923 P.2d 1383,1385 (Utah 1996) (stating that the elements of vicarious liability
are that an employer-employee relationship existed and that the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment). Whether an employment relationship exists is often a question
of fact, and is determined by factors including compensation, right to control, intent, and
context of the business. See Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass fn, 845
P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1992).
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B.

The Jury's Finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a
Volunteer Resolved the Factual Issue on Which the District
Court Denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion

In Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, it argued that because there was no evidence
that Derek was an employee of Cheryl, Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl should be dismissed.
Ms. Guss opposed the motion, arguing that whether an agency relationship exists is a
question of fact for the jury. The district court agreed with Ms. Guss, and denied the
Summary Judgment Motion on the basis that there existed an issue of fact regarding whether
Derek was an employee of Cheryl or a volunteer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
district court stated: "I believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine
whether or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the
business should be liable or could be liable."2 (HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A). The Court
therefore denied the Summary Judgment Motion.
The jury returned its Special Verdict, and found that Derek was a volunteer in
Interrogatory No. 6, which provided:

2

At the May 21, 2007 hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court
speculated as to whether Cheryl could be held liable if the jury found that Derek was a
gratuitous servant. The Court stated: "Why can't the corporation be liable because the
accident, even if he's not employee? Let's say he's just a servant non-paid, a gratuitous
servant, so to speak that does things at the request of the corporation and as a result of a
request to him something happens and the corporation - why should the corporation be held
liable?" (HT 5:9-14).
Ms. Guss, however, did not pursue a claim that Derek was acting as Cheryl's
"gratuitous servant." Ms. Guss did not request that the jury be instructed on facts necessary
to support the conclusion that Derek was a gratuitous servant. Accordingly, any such claim
is waived. See Gourdin, 845 P.2d at 244 n. 1 (the "gratuitous servant" document was not
addressed on appeal because it was not raised at trial).
916635vl
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Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer.
Employee
Volunteer
X
(R. 866-67 ^| 6; see Exhibit B). Implicit in Interrogatory No. 6 is that Derek was not an
employee of Cheryl. The jury's factual finding conclusively determined "whether or not the
son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the business should be
liable or could be liable." {See HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A). The district court, therefore,
should have reversed its ruling on CheryFs Summary Judgment Motion, as set forth below.
C.

The District Court Should Have Reversed its Ruling on
Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, Pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in Light of the
Jury's Finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a
Volunteer

Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "allows a court to change its position
with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case."
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Timm v.
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1184-85 (Utah 1993)). A copy of the Trembly decision is attached
hereto as Exhibit D. Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part, that
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). "Thus, a motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court
to reconsider its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment/' Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311
(citing Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85).
The factors a court may consider in reconsidering a prior ruling when
(1) the matter is presented in a "different light" or under "different
circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party
offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does not
reconsider the prior ruling: (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an
issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court.
Id. at 11 (citing State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis
added). See also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945,958-59 (Utah Ct. App.
1999) (same).
The jury's finding that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, and instead, was
a volunteer, as set forth in Interrogatory No. 6 of the Special Verdict, resolved the legal
question of whether Cheryl is vicariously liable for Derek's negligence.3 The district court's
earlier denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion was based on this precise factual
question. Thus, after the trial and prior to the entry of judgment, Cheryl filed a Rule 54(b)
Motion, arguing that the district court should reverse its decision on Cheryl's Summary
Judgment Motion4 in light of the jury's finding. {See R. 856-64; 891-905).

3

The jury found that Derek was negligent in Interrogatory No. 3 of the Special Verdict.
(R.866U3).
4

After the May 21, 2007 hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court
directed Ms. Guss's counsel to prepare an order. Ms. Guss's counsel did not submit a
proposed order denying Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. Therefore, Cheryl seeks
(continued...)
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The jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 6 constituted a "different light" or "different
circumstances" within the meaning of Trembly. The Summary Judgment Motion was
decided based on the evidence of whether or not Derek was an agent or employee of Cheryl
and, because there was an issue of fact regarding the foregoing, the motion was denied.
After the trial, it was undisputed that there was no employment relationship between Cheryl
and Derek.
In the district court's Minute Entry, dated June 1, 2009, by which it denied Cheryl's
Rule 54(b) Motion {see Exhibit C), it did not address Cheryl's argument that the jury's
finding presented a "different light" or "different circumstances" by which to reverse the
district court's decision denying the Summary Judgment Motion. Furthermore, the district
court never addressed the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6. The district court's denial of
Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion effectively renders Interrogatory No. 6 superfluous - having no
legal effect whatsoever, which is set forth in greater detail in Part III.
In conclusion, it was error for the district court to deny Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion.
Cheryl requests that the Court reverse the district court's decision.
II.

THE PURPOSE OF THE JURY TRIAL WAS TO RESOLVE THE
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER CHERYL COULD BE HELD
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR DEREK'S NEGLIGENCE
Ms. Guss filed this lawsuit against Cheryl in an attempt to hold Cheryl vicariously

liable for Derek's negligence. Again, at the hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion,

4

(...continued)
reversal of the Court's decision, which is referenced in the transcript of the hearing. {See HT 10:1116; see Exhibit A).
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Cheryl argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence because the
evidence showed that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. The district court, however,
disagreed with Cheryl, and held that there was an issue of fact regarding whether Derek was
or was not an employee of Cheryl. On that basis, Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl was not
dismissed, and Ms. Guss's vicarious liability claim against Cheryl proceeded to trial. After
the jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, thus resolving whether Cheryl
could be held vicariously liable, the district court erroneously entered judgment against
Cheryl on the notion that Cheryl "could be" held independently negligent. (See R. 926; see
Exhibit C).
A.

The District Court Confirmed that the Sole Issue at Trial
Was Whether Derek Was an Employee of Cheryl or a
Volunteer

On January 16,2007, Ms. Guss filed her First Amended Complaint, which alleges that
"Derek Edvalson, acting for and on behalf of Cheryl, Inc." caused injuries to Ms. Guss
when he raised her wheelchair off of the ground and she was dropped. (R. 37 % 8) (emphasis
added).
Shortly thereafter, Cheryl filed its Summary Judgment Motion, arguing that Ms.
Guss's vicarious liability claim against Cheryl must be dismissed because Derek was not an
employee of Cheryl. At the hearing on CheryPs Summary Judgment Motion, Cheryl's
counsel stated: "[W]e have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff
has a burden to show that Cheryl, Inc. is vicariously liable as the employer and that the
evidence is insufficient. . . ." (HT 4:8-11; see Exhibit A). Ms. Guss's counsel responded
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by arguing that there was evidence that Derek was an employee of Cheryl, based on evidence
that he shoveled the sidewalk and that occasionally, he was paid for doing some things. (HT
8:14-22; see Exhibit A). The district court was not convinced that the evidence was
conclusive that there was no employment relationship between Cheryl and Derek.
Accordingly, the district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion and stated: "I
believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine whether or not the son is a
volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the business should be liable or
could be liable. I'll therefore deny the motion for summary judgment." (HT 10:11-16; see
Exhibit C) (emphasis added).
Throughout the course of litigation, Cheryl conducted discovery and prepared for trial
in a manner consistent with what the district court had ordered at the hearing on the Summary
Judgment Motion.
Approximately one week prior to the trial, Cheryl submitted a Special Verdict form,
and included Interrogatory No. 6 regarding whether Derek was an employee of Cheryl. No
objection to Interrogatory No. 6 was made {see TT 477:20-21). And, Ms. Guss's counsel did
not submit a proposed Special Verdict form or a jury instruction, explaining the legal effect
of Derek being a volunteer. Similarly, the district court did not include any interrogatory in
the Special Verdict form or a jury instruction regarding the effect of Derek being a volunteer.
At the trial, Cheryl's counsel questioned witnesses, including Cheryl Edvalson and
Derek, regarding whether Derek was an employee of Cheryl. For example, Cheryl's counsel
asked Cheryl Edvalson whether Derek had ever been employed by Cheryl, and whether he
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had ever provided facials or skin care services, to which Ms. Edvalson responded negatively.
(TT 177:10-16). Cheryl's counsel asked Derek whether he was ever employed by Cheryl,
and, he testified that although he would occasionally help out his mother by mowing the lawn
and shoveling the front walk, he was never employed by Cheryl. (TT 383:3-15).
Then, during closing arguments, Cheryl's counsel said that if the jury found that
Derek was a volunteer, then Cheryl could not be held liable. (TT 529:4-13). Ms. Guss's
counsel did not object to the statement, nor did the district court offer a curative instruction.
After the jury deliberated, it returned its Special Verdict, and found in Interrogatory
No. 6 that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. (R. 866-67 ^ 6).
Then, in response to Cheryl's post-trial Rule 54(b) Motion, Ms. Guss argued, for the
first time, and the district court held, that Cheryl "could be" held liable for independent
negligence. (R. 26) (emphasis added). The district court did not offer any explanation for
this conclusory statement. Nor did the district court attempt to address the effect of
Interrogatory No. 6.
Thereafter, judgment was entered against Cheryl based on the district court's
unsupported and speculative post-verdict allegation that Cheryl could be found independently
negligent. Most importantly, the district court's entry of judgment based on independent
negligence directly contradicted what it had told counsel at the hearing on Cheryl's Summary
Judgment Motion - that Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl was to proceed to trial to resolve
whether Cheryl could be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence.
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B.

Ms. Guss Did Not Allege that Cheryl was "Independently
Negligent" Until After the Jury Reached a Special Verdict

In Ms. Guss's First Amended Complaint, filed January 16,2007, the only negligent
act alleged of is set forth below:
8.
The Plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition,
was leaving the premises of the Defendant, Cheryl, Inc., when Defendant
Derek Edvalson, acting for and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc., attempted to pick
up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle. While raising
[sic] wheelchair off of the ground, the wheelchair rotated and the Plaintiff
was dropped onto the concrete driveway below, sustaining the injuries alleged
herein.
(R. 37 \ 8) (emphasis added). Ms. Guss's Second Amended Complaint, filed April 1,2008
- long after the Court ruled on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion,5 added no new claims
or allegations against Cheryl. Therefore, the only alleged negligence is that Derek was
negligent when he attempted to raise the wheelchair off the ground, which caused Ms. Guss
to fall to the concrete driveway, causing injuries. (R. 305 \ 8). And, the only allegation
against Cheryl is that Derek was "actingfor and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc." an allegation
that Cheryl is vicariously liable for Derek's allegedly negligent act. (R. 305 Tj 8) (emphasis
added).

5

As set forth above, the issue on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion was whether Derek
was a volunteer or employee of Cheryl, and based on the foregoing, whether Cheryl could
be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence. This Summary Judgment Motion was
denied on May 21, 2007. Ms. Guss had plenty of time between May 2007 and April 2008
(when the Second Amended Complaint was filed) to consider whether to bring an
independent negligence claim against Cheryl. Ms. Guss's decision not to was due to the fact
that this case was really a claim against Derek, and Ms. Guss was merely attempting to hold
Cheryl liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
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Ms. Guss did not allege that Cheryl was independently negligent until after the trial
when she responded to Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion.6 (See R. 887).
Ms. Guss, in her pleadings and throughout the course of litigation, did not provide
Cheryl with any notice that it was entitled to recover against Cheryl on a theory of
independent negligence. See Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, % 14,122 P.3d 622 (2005)
(a plaintiff is required to give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of
the claim") (citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)).7
Courts have considered whether a plaintiff had properly provided notice to a
defendant of an independent negligence claim (in addition to a claim for vicarious liability),
and thus, whether the defendant could be held liable for independent negligence. In
Longneckerv. Loyola University Medical Ctr., 891 N.E.2d 954 (111. App. Ct. 2008), an action
was brought against a surgeon and a hospital for negligence after an unsuccessful heart
transplant. Id. at 956-57. The jury found, among other things, that the hospital had
committed institutional negligence (independent negligence). Id. at 956. On appeal, the
hospital argued that it could not be held liable for institutional negligence because the
plaintiffs complaint only alleged vicarious liability for the surgeon's malpractice. Id. at 964.
After reviewing the complaint, the Court held that the plaintiff did plead sufficient facts to

6

In Ms. Guss's memorandum in opposition to Cheryl's 54(b) Motion, Ms. Guss does not
specify any facts on which Cheryl could be held independently negligent. (See R. 881-90).
7

Furthermore, if a claim or defense is not pleaded, it is waived. See, e.g., Devine v. Cook,
279 P.2d 1073, 1078-79 (Utah 1955) (it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on
contributory negligence because the defendants did not plead contributory negligence).
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put the hospital on notice of this separate theory of liability because the plaintiff alleged that
the hospital "failed to properly test, inspect, and diagnose the donor heart, and that both
defendants otherwise deviated from the standard of care." Id. at 965 (internal citation
omitted). See also Voorhees v. University of Pennsylvania, 1997 WL 1433733 (Pa. Com. PL
1997), 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 302,316 (a hospital could be held independently negligent because
there was "specific mention [in the complaint] of negligence in the defendants' failure to
'prophylactically treat' the plaintiff').

Unlike the facts pleaded in the complaints in

Longnecker and Voorhees, Ms. Guss wholly failed to plead any facts to put Cheryl on notice
that it sought relief against Cheryl for independent negligence. Again, the only factual
allegation of negligence is that when Derek lifted Ms. Guss's wheelchair, Ms. Guss was
dropped and she fell on the concrete driveway. (R. 305 ^| 8).
In Busch v. Flangas, 837 P.2d 438 (Nev. 1992), the Supreme Court of Nevada dealt
with a plaintiff that pleaded the opposite of that which Ms. Guss pleaded. In Busch, the
plaintiff pleaded independent negligence against the defendant, and did not plead vicarious
liability. Id. at 440. Because the plaintiff "tardily mentionfedj 'the theory of respondeat
superior,' but neither the complaint nor the [summary judgment] motion documents
supported] this kind of claim of liability," the Court held that the plaintiff could not recover
under a theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 441 n. 1 (emphasis added).
Like the plaintiff in Busch, Ms. Guss's post-verdict allegation that Cheryl was
independently negligent was tardy. Thus, Cheryl cannot be held liable for independent
negligence.
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III.

THE DENIAL OF THE RULE 54(b) MOTION DEFEATED THE
EFFECT OF THE JURY'S FINDING IN INTERROGATORY NO. 6 OF
THE SPECIAL VERDICT
Cheryl included Interrogatory No. 6 in its Special Verdict form and Ms. Guss did not

object to this interrogatory. (TT 477:20-21). The district court included Interrogatory No.
6 without hesitation. After the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, but also apportioned
fault against Cheryl, Cheryl filed its Rule 54(b) Motion, arguing that Ms. Guss's claim
against Cheryl should be dismissed.8 The district court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion
by stating in a one-page Minute Entry: "The Jury may have inferred from the evidence and
a review of the Verdict Form that liability could be assessed against CHERYL, INC.
independent of the status of Derek Edvalson." (R. 926; see Exhibit C) (emphasis added).
The district court's attempt to explain the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6 by stating that
liability could be assessed against Cheryl is wholly inadequate. In order to enter judgment
against Cheryl, the district court had to describe the evidence showing that Cheryl was
independently negligent, consistent with the finding that Derek was a volunteer, not that it
could be.9

8

Again, Cheryl argued in its Rule 54(b) Motion that the district court should reverse its
denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion in light of the jury's finding that Derek was
a volunteer. (R. 856-64).
9

In the case of a special verdict, it is the jury's duty to decide the facts of the case.
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, K 16,47 P.3d 76. "The [trial] court then applies the
law to the facts as found and renders a verdict." Id. (citing Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric
Ass 'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970). Thus, neither the jury or district court conclusively
found or decided that Cheryl was independently negligent.
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More importantly, the district court's denial of Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion defeats
the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6. Cheryl was "entitled to have the benefit of the jury's
[finding] on issues of fact." MelHardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913,917
(Utah 1979). See also Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (same). Furthermore, "it [was] not the trial court's prerogative to disregard
or nullify [the jury's finding] by making findings of his own." Id.
In First Security Bank of Utah, Natl Ass 'n v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886
(Utah 1969), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E, the defendants deposited a
check with the plaintiff bank, which was dishonored by the bank. Id. at 887. When the
check was dishonored, the bank charged the check amount against the defendants' account,
thus creating a large overdraft. Id. After a dispute arose between the parties, the bank sued
the defendants, and the defendants argued that the bank bore the loss because the bank (1)
did not provide the required notice of the dishonored check; and (2) there was an accord and
satisfaction. Id. Then, although the "jury answered interrogatories favorable to defendants
on the issues of failure to give notice and accord and satisfaction," the trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. Id.
Specifically, the jury found that the bank was negligent because it failed to notify the
defendants within the time prescribed by law that the check was dishonored, and that there
was a complete accord and satisfaction. Id. at 888. The Supreme Court of Utah stated:
The difficulty which exists in this case is that, notwithstanding the findings of
the jury in favor of defendants as set forth above, which the trial court stated
that he 'accepted,' 'approved,' and found 'true and correct,' he nevertheless
awarded the plaintiff credit for the amount of the check. This was done on the
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basis of the court's 'further finding' that the defendants knew or should have
known of [the drawer's] financial instability and, in addition, that they were
kept fully informed of the plaintiff bank's continuing efforts to collect the
check.
The effect of this 'further finding' was actually to contravene the finding made
by the jury that the plaintiff bank 'was negligent because it failed to give [the
defendants] notice in the time prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, about
the [check] not being honored . . . . The same observation is pertinent to the
action of the trial court with respect to the issue of accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 889.
The Court explained that "[i]t is recognized that where a case is submitted to the jury
on special verdicts, the trial court may make corrections of obvious errors or defects therein
" Id. "But when a party has demanded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury find
the facts, and it is not the trial courts prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith
and thereby defeat the effect of the jury Js findings." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed
the judgment against the defendants. Id.
In Mel Hardman Productions, 604 P.2d 913, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit F, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract for failing to deliver a
motion picture to plaintiff. Id. at 914. The defendant defended on the ground that he did
perform the contract by delivering film to the plaintiff, and he also filed a counterclaim for
profits that he should have received after the film was sold and distributed by the plaintiff.
Id. After a trial, the jury returned its answers to interrogatories that were favorable to the
defendant - that the defendant did not breach the contract, and that plaintiff had used and
distributed the film. Id. The trial court, however, concluded that the defendant was not
entitled to any residuals or compensation for the distribution of the film. Id. at 914-15,
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The Supreme Court of Utah stated that "the trial court decided to disregard the
findings of the jury and to rule in favor of the plaintiff on the issues in dispute as a matter
of law." Id. at 916 (emphasis added). The Court cited Lundahl by stating that "it is not the
trial court's prerogative to disregard or nullify" the findings of the jury. Id. at 917. The
Court reinstated the jury's finding, which entitled the defendant to recover on his
counterclaim. Id. at 918.
The district court, after denying Cheryl' s Summary Judgment Motion on the sole basis
that an issue of fact regarding the employment relationship between Cheryl and Derek,
wholly disregarded the jury's finding that Derek was a volunteer. It was not the district
court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent with what the jury found in Interrogatory
No. 6 and to defeat the legal effect of the jury's finding that Derek was not employed by
Cheryl. See Lundahl 454 P.2d at 889.
IV.

IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DENIES CHERYL'S REQUEST
TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF CHERYL'S
RULE 54(b) MOTION, THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL
Cheryl argues above, particularly in Part I Section C, that it was error for the district

court to deny Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion and ignore the jury's finding that Derek was a
volunteer. After the jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, there was no
longer a "genuine issue as to any material fact," under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The factual finding that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl presented the
Summary Judgment Motion in a "different light" or "different circumstances" under the
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meaning of Trembly. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 131L Thus, Cheryl requests that the Court
reverse the district court's denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion.
Furthermore, this Court should reverse the district court's entry of judgment against
Cheryl because it disregarded the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6. See Part III above;
see Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d at 889 (the Court reversed the judgment); MelHardman
Productions, 604 P.2d at 918 (the Court reinstated the jury's finding and reversed the
judgment).
However, to the extent that this Court finds that the jury reached an inconsistent
verdict, the Court should order a new trial. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391,
396-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging that in the case of an inconsistent verdict, a
new trial must be ordered). The jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, but
also apportioned fault against Cheryl. These findings of fact are inconsistent under the
doctrine of vicarious liability. See Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865,
869 (Utah 1981) ("[A] jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be
read harmoniously . . . . " ) .
A trial court cannot "defeat the effect of the jury's findings." Lundahl, 454 P. 2d at
889. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "[tjhere is no priority of one answer over
another

" Heno v. Sprint/United Management Co., 208 F.3d 847, 854 (citing Freeman

v. Chicago Park Dist., 189F.3d613,615(7 th Cir. 1999)). The Court should therefore order
a new trial because of the inconsistency in the Special Verdict. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 895
P.2d at 396-97; Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1990).
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Cheryl respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
district court's denial of Cheryl, Inc. 's Motion for Revision of the Decision Denying
Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative, order a new trial.
DATED this /}

day of January, 2010.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

p. (l/jU

Bv:
/ [ iteA^ct^
J. Angus Edwards
Jessica P. Wilde
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 21, 2007

2

HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Be seated.

7

v. Derek Edvalson, 060903837.

8

appearances for the record.

9
10

MR. RAWLINGS:

MR. TAYLOR:

Good afternoon, my name is Kumen

MR. EDWARDS: Angus Edwards for the defendant
Cheryl, Inc.

15

THE COURT:

16

judgment.

17

proceed.

18

Yes, Your Honor, good afternoon,

Taylor, I'm for the defendant Derek Edvalson.

13
14

Counsel, enter your

William Rawlings for the plaintiff.

11
12

This is the matter of Guss

This is on for a motion for summary

Cheryl, Inc. is the moving party.

MR. EDWARDS:

You may

Thank you, Your Honor.

The claims

19

against Cheryl, Inc. are for vicarious liability.

20

Edvalson was added as a defendant somewhat recently and so

21

now we have both the alleged principal and agent as

22

defendants.

23

as a defendant.

24
25

Derek

For a while we only had the purported employer
That has been remedied.

Cheryl, Inc. operates an in-home salon in a home
that's owned by David and Cheryl Edvalson and the defendant

1

that was added was their son, Derek Edvalson, back at the

2

time of the accident, March 12, 2004 when he was 21 years old

3

now; now he's 24.

4

The plaintiff was a customer of the salon for

5

approximately three to four years before the accident and is

6

in a wheelchair. . So this accident involves Derek Edvalson,

7

the son, helping the plaintiff into her car after she

8

finished at the in-home salon.

9

judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff has a burden to

And we have moved for summary

10

show that Cheryl, Inc. is vicariously liable as the employer

11

and that the evidence is insufficient and we're really only

12

relying on one case in Utah, Glover v. Boy Scouts of America.

13

And the reason we're relying on that case is the court did

14

two things that are important for this case.

15

granted summary judgment and as the Court knows in personal

16

injury cases, negligence in particular, summary judgment is

17

not commonly granted.

18

issue, Glover allowed summary judgment to be granted.

19

The court

But when it comes to an employment

The second reason we're relying on Glover is that

20

in that case there was all kinds of evidence of an employment

21

relationship because one of the parties to the employment

22

relationship sought to have an employment relationship

23

declared.

24

where the employer claims that it was not the employer of Mr.

25

Edvalson at the time he was helping the plaintiff.

And that is categorically different from this case

He was

1

just the son helping his mom.

And the son doesn't say he's

2

an employee at the time he was helping the plaintiff into the

3

car.

4

the operative law and I think the only thing I want to do for

5

purposes of oral argument is just go through a little bit of

6

Derek Edvalson's deposition testimony because that deposition

7

was taken after my motion for summary judgment was filed.

8

has been attached to one of the opposing memoranda.

So those are the really operative facts in this case,

9

THE COURT:

It

Why can't the corporation be liable

10

because the accident, even if he's not employee?

11

he's just a servant non-paid, a gratuitous servant, so to

12

speak that does things at the request of the corporation and

13

as a result of a request to him something happens and the

14

corporation - why shouldn't the corporation be liable?

15

MR. EDWARDS:

Let's say

Well, I would agree with the Court on

16

Mr. Edvalson doesn't have to be paid.

He can be a volunteer

17

employee.

18

payment, although a factor to be considered, is by no means

19

dispositive.

20

and in the other parties' memoranda where the Gordon v. Scara

21

case, I think is how it's pronounced, but for example where a

22

young boy was injured as a volunteer and in exchange for

23

mowing lawns he was admitted into this recreational facility,

24

you know, that he was a voluntary employee was the issue in

25

that case.

That's clearly what the Glover case said.

So

And there's some case law cited in my memoranda

So the payment isn't the issue, so I would agree

1

with the Court on that issue.

2

point the Court is making.

I also agree on the second

3

Under the Atkinson v. State Line Casino case that I

4

cited, a pure volunteer, not even an employment relationship,

5

a pure volunteer can also be liable.

6

take it one step farther and perhaps to the court's question

7

we could say Mr. Edvalson wasn't even an employee, wasn't

8

even a volunteer, but as a volunteer helped this woman on

9

behalf of the business, the business can still be liable.

In other words, we can

10

And the Atkinson case presents the kind of case where that's

11

probably clearly appropriate.

12

facts in too much detail unless the Court has questions about

13

it, but essentially an intoxicated patron of the casino is

14

sort of in the safety of the casino - in fact, I think this

15

was this court's case if I remember right.

16

the facts of that case too much, but just to say if you have

17

a person and you make them worse off, even as a pure

18

volunteer, there's no payment, there's no consideration,

19

there's no exchange at all, if you leave them worse off you

20

are subject to liability for purposes of summary judgment

21

where those kinds of issues should be allowed to go to a

22

jury.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

I don't want to go into the

I won't go into

So why shouldn't this be allowed to go

to the jury then?
MR. EDWARDS:

I'd just step back and again and say

1

in this case unlike the other cases we've been talking about

2

where one of the parties to this relationship, meaning either

3

Derek Edvalson, the son, or Cheryl, Inc. and his mother is

4

the principal, those two parties both say there isn't an

5

employment relationship, there isn't a volunteer relationship

6

on behalf of the business in their deposition testimony.

7

don't have a similar kind of factual basis like we have in

8

these other cases.

9

outsider, a patron who is saying there is an employment

That's the distinction.

10

relationship.

11

saying no, there was no such relationship.

12

nutshell what I'm saying.

We

We have an

The people involved in the relationship are

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. RAWLINGS:

And that's in a

Thank you.

Mr. Rawlings?
Very briefly, Your Honor, I'd just

15

say that, you know, whether he says there's an employment

16

relationship or not, I don't think mere words should be the

17

deciding factor.

18

think are more important.

19

his mother's request in furtherance of her business.

20

was a business patron, a business invitee if you will.

21

don't see how there isn't an issue here as to whether or not

22

there's an agency relationship, some sort of - it's certainly

23

more than volunteer if somebody requests assistance, and this

24

is not the first time.

25

times, so I don't think there's any question that there's an

Certainly the actions of the parties I
He was - Derek was responding to
This
I

This had happened several other

1
2

issue here of whether or not general negligence principles
twould

apply or agency relationship would apply.

This isn't

3

somebody who's walking on the street and she says come over

4

here and could you help this lady into her car.

5

son and she says come over here, he came home from school and

6

she's asking to assist.

7

picked up my client who has issues of a quadriplegia and

8

carry her from her car into the business and back.

9

particular case they were working with a wheelchair.

This is her

In fact, in the past he's actually

In this
So this

10

seems to be the first time that this had occurred.

11

understand why he was even involved if there is a wheelchair

12

to get her to her car, but that's what happened on this

13

particular day.

14

I don't

I mean, I can go into all the details about the

15

governing board who cleaned off the sidewalk has testified in

16

the deposition he cleaned off the sidewalk of the snow so

17

people could get in and out of the business home residence;

18

that he would get paid once in a while for doing some of

19

these things he would have stock - foot stock that would be

20

delivered and take downstairs, trying to show these kind of

21

little issues that might show some sort of an employment

22

relationship, but frankly I think the issue was so clear I

23

really don't understand why we're here.

24

somebody to do something for my business and that person is

25

not trained, they fail, they do something wrong, then I think

I think if I ask

8

1

a jury has got a right to determine whether or not I should

2

be held accountable for that.

3

nutshell is where I'm coming from.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. TAYLOR:

So that I suppose in a
Thank you.

Mr. Taylor?
Your Honor, I did not file an

6

opposition to the motion for summary judgment because I came

7

in so late.

8

three days after I filed an answer.

9

motion and affidavit.

10

that or wait on that.

All the discovery was done, the motion was filed

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. TAYLOR:

13

THE COURT:

14
15

I filed a Rule 56(f)

I don't know if you want me to argue

Very well, we can just wait.
Okay.
Mr. Edwards, anything else you want to

say?
MR. EDWARDS:

Just two last comments, if I may.

I

16

mentioned earlier I was going to comment on two pieces of

17

testimony Derek Edvalson's deposition, I'm just going to

18

briefly do that.

19

said that he was an employee.

20

the question, you didn't give any specific money - "You

21

didn't get any specific money for assisting Teresa, did you?"

22

He answered no.

23

specific activity, did you gain anything by that?"

24

answer was, monentarily, no. And then Mr. Rawlings asked

25

him, "Any other way?"

The examples where Derek Edvalson himself
He was asked by Mr. Rawlings

"Any benefit that was given to you for that
His

And his answer was, "Just helping out

1

a fellow human being, trying to do the right thing.

2

it gave me a good feeling to help someone else, if that's a

3

benefit.7'

4

I guess

And then the other even shorter testimony is when

5

Mr. Edvalson was asked about whether he received instructions

6

about helping the plaintiff into the car, he testified

7

Teresa, the plaintiff - that's the plaintiff - "Teresa always

8

asked me or just told me what to do.

9

just had her mouth shut."

10

THE COURT:

It was never - my mom

Thank you.

Well, in this matter I believe that the

11

objections made by the defendant are well taken.

I believe

12

this is a factoral question for the jury to determine whether

13

or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her

14

business, and therefore the business should be liable or

15

could be liable.

16

judgment.

I'll therefore deny the motion for summary

17

MR. RAWLINGS:

18

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

What's the status of this case now?

19

you want to get together and work out a new discovery plan

20

since you have a new party involved?

21

MR. TAYLOR:

That's what I intend to do, Your

22

Honor, is try to get a new discovery plan so I can do some

23

discovery on these issues.

24
25

THE COURT:
work out one.

Do

Okay.

So you need to get together and

Okay.
10

1

MR. EDWARDS:

Thank you.

2

MR. RAWLINGS:

3

MR. TAYLOR:

4

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Thfrd Judicial District

MAR 1 6 2009
C

T ^ L £ I A K E COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERESA GUSS,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CASE NO. 060903837

vs.
CHERYL, INC.,

Judge L. A. Dever

Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find the
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages assessed
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was negligent in performing any one or more of the specific
acts of negligence alleged by the plaintiff?

ANSWER:
2.

Yes

y

No

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the

evidence that negligence of the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was either the sole proximate cause or a
contributing proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

\ /

No

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant, Derek Edvalson was negligent in performing any one or more if
the specific acts of negligence alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes

/

No

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant, Derek Edvalson, was either the sole proximate cause or a contributing
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
ANSWER:
5.

Yes

]/

No

If you have answered Questions 2 and 4, <cyes," then, and only the, answer the

following question: Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what
percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Defendant, Cheryl, Inc.

*"fZ~

%

B.

Defendant, Derek Edvalson

2^0

%

C.

Plaintiff, Teresa Guss

%
TOTAL

6.

100

%

Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a
2

preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that Defendant, Derek Edvalson, was an
employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer.
Employee
Volunteer
7

y

If you have answered either or both of questions 2 and 4 "Yes", state the amount

of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the
plaintiffs injuries. If neither question was answered "Yes," do not answer this question.

Special Damages:
A. Past Special Damages
B. Future Special Damages

$J3££J6."
00

General Damages

$ 3^,^.^

TOTAL

DATED this IZ-

day ofFebniiay, 2009.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TERESA GUSS,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
vs.
CHERYL, INC. and DEREK EDVALSON,
Defendants.

Case No. 060903837
Judge: L.A. DEVER

The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendant CHERYL, INC.'s
Motion to Renew Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to the Proposed
Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff.
The Court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties. Defendant's Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Jury may have inferred from the
evidence and a review of the Verdict Form that liability could be assessed against
CHERYL, INC. independent of the status of Derek Edvaison. The Special Verdict Form,
signed by the Jury, assessed liability to CHERYL, INC.
Defendant's objections to the costs listed in the Judgment are well taken. The
amount of costs is limited to $405.36, as outlined in the Defendant's memorandum.

Plaintiff is directed to prepare a revised Judgment in the amount of $188,813.49.
Dated 28th day of May, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry dated
this

Q\^ " day of May, 2009, postage prepaid, to the following:

J. Angus Edwards

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
William R. Rawlings
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS
11576 South State Street, Suite 503
Draper, UT 84020
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106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-

c

ure
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Joe D, TREMBLY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 930635-CA.
Nov. 10, 1994.

Former employee sued former employer for breach
of implied-in-fact employment contract, breach of
written contract, breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Third District
Court, Summit County, David S. Young, J., after
denial of employer's summary judgment motion by
previous judge, granted summary judgment for employer, finding that employee's employment was atwill. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Davis, J., held that: (1) judge could reconsider prior
denial of summary judgment, and (2) employee
failed to prove that he was employed other than atwill.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
|1] Judgment 228 €=^345
228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k345 k. Judgments Which May Be
Opened or Vacated. Most Cited Cases
Motion for relief from judgment "for any other
reason justifying relief was not available, where
party was asking court to reconsider denial of motion for summary judgment, which is not final order
or judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(7).
[2J Courts 106 €==>99(1)
106 Courts

10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In action in which multiple claims or multiple
parties are involved, court may change its position
with respect to any order or decision before final
judgment is rendered. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).
[3] Judgment 228 C=>186
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Party's motion for relief from denial of summary
judgment motion would be treated as motion for revision of order in action involving multiple claims
or multiple parties before entry of final judgment,
as substance, not caption of motion is dispositive in
determining character of motion. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rules 54(b), 60(b)(7).
|4) Judgment 228 €^>186
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228k 186 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Decision to entertain motion for revision of order in
action involving multiple claims or multiple parties
prior to entry of final judgment is question of law.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).
15] Courts 106 C=>99(1)
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
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106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Rule which permits court to revise order in action
involving multiple claims or multiple parties prior
to entry of final judgment allows for possibility of
judge changing his or her mind. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 54(b).
j6] Judgment 228 C=>186
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Motion for revision of order in action involving
multiple parties or multiple claims prior to entry of
final judgment is proper vehicle to ask court to reconsider prior denial of motion for summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).

denial of employer's motion for summary judgment
on employee's implied-in-fact contract claim by different judge in same action, where judge believed
that cases which were decided after denial of motion warranted reconsideration.
(9) Courts 106 €=>99(7)
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases
"Law of the case" doctrine, which provides that one
district court judge cannot overrule another district
court judge of equal authority, has evolved to avoid
delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is
presented with issue identical to one which has
already been passed upon by coordinate judge in
same case.

171 Motions 267 C=>39
[101 Courts 106 C=>90(1)
267 Motions
267k39 k. Reargument or Rehearing. Most Cited
Cases
Court can consider several factors in determining
propriety of reconsidering prior ruling, including
but not limited to whether: matter is presented in
different light or under different circumstances;
there has been change in governing law; party offers new evidence; manifest injustice will result if
court does not reconsider prior ruling; court needs
to correct its own errors; or issue was inadequately
briefed when first contemplated by court.

106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k88 Previous Decisions as Controlling
or as Precedents
106k90 Decisions of Same Court or
Co-Ordinate Court
106k90(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Notwithstanding law of the case doctrine, trial court
is not inexorably bound by its own precedents.

|8) Judgment 228 C=>186
[11] Courts 106 €=>99(1)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228k 186 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Judge relied on proper grounds for reconsidering

106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
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as Law of the Case
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judge is free to change ruling in case involving
multiple claims or multiple parties until final decision is formally rendered. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
54(b).
(121 Courts 106 €=>99(3)
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(3) k. Jurisdiction, Dismissal,
Nonsuit, and Summary Judgment, Rulings Relating
To. Most Cited Cases
Denial of motion for summary judgment was not final order, and thus law of the case doctrine did not
preclude judge from revisiting prior ruling of different judge in same action.

10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases
Judges 227 €=>24
227 Judges
227III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
227k24 k. Judicial Powers and Functions in
General. Most Cited Cases
On rotating calendar, two judges, while different
persons, constitute single judicial office for law of
the case purposes.
[15J Appeal and Error 30 €=>949
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k949 k. Allowance of Remedy and
Matters of Procedure in General. Most Cited Cases

[13) Courts 106 €=^99(7)

Motions 267 €=>39

106 Courts
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
10611(G) Rules of Decision
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case
as Law of the Case
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases
Single judge is entitled to correct any interim order
previously made, and even though a location within
a judicial district is on a rotating judge calendar,
authority of judge who actually decides case on
merits to correct previously entered order is undiminished.

267 Motions
267k39 k. Reargument or Rehearing. Most Cited
Cases
It is within sound discretion of trial court to grant
motion for revision of order in case involving multiple claims or multiple parties prior to entry of final judgment, and discretion to do so will not be
disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).

[141 Courts 106 C=>99(7)
106 Courts
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Procedure

[16] Judgment 228 €=^186
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
Judge did not abuse his discretion, in wrongful termination action, by granting employer's motion for
relief, based on cases which were decided after
judge who had previously been handling action
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denied summary judgment on employee's impliedin-fact contract claim, where one case considered
issues similar to those raised in case at bar, and
facts in other case were analogous to the facts in
case at bar, and in that case the state Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to survive motion for summary judgment. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b).
[171 Appeal and Error 30 €>=>842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Whether summary judgment was appropriate is
question of law and Court of Appeals grants no deference to trial court's decision, but rather, reviews
it for correctness.
[181 Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When reviewing grant of summary judgment, Court
of Appeals liberally construes all inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from facts in favor of
nonmoving party.
[191 Labor and Employment 231H C=?58
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk58 k. Questions of Law and Fact as to
Employment Status. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k43 Master and Servant)
Although existence of implied-in-fact employment

contract is normally question of fact left to discretion of jury, court retains power to decide whether,
as matter of law, reasonable jury could find that implied contract exists.
[20J Labor and Employment 231H C=*51
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy
Statements
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
Employee had no implied-in-fact employment contract with employer whereby he could be terminated only after certain disciplinary procedures were
followed; employee handbook which unequivocally
reserved at-will employer status and right to terminate employee at any time with or without cause
was issued after alleged representations were made,
employee retained employment with employer with
full knowledge of modified condition of his employment, and retention of employment constituted
acceptance of offer to remain employed at employer as at-will employee.
[211 Contracts 95 €=>28(3)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95k28 Evidence of Agreement
95k28(3) k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Although evidence of oral statements standing
alone may establish implied-in-fact contract, such
evidence must be sufficient to fulfill requirements
of unilateral offer.
[221 Labor and Employment 231H C==>50
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy
Statements
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231Hk50 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant)
If employee has knowledge of distributed handbook
that changes condition of employee's employment
and employee remains in company's employ, modified conditions become part of employee's employment contract.
[23J Labor and Employment 231H €=>47
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of
Contract. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant)
Original employment contract may be modified or
replaced by subsequent unilateral contract.
[24] Labor and Employment 231H €==>47
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of
Contract. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant)
Employee's retention of employment after modification or replacement of original employment contract by subsequent unilateral contract constitutes
acceptance of offer of unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on job, although free to leave, employment supplies necessary consideration for of- fer.
[25] Labor and Employment 231H €=>34(2)
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
23 lHk31 Contracts
231Hk34 Formation; Requisites and
Validity
231Hk34(2) k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k3(l) Master and Servant)

231 HI In General
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term;
Employment At-Will
231Hk40(3) k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k3(l) Master and Servant)
General statements of fairness made to oil company
employees through training video were not sufficiently definite to operate as contract provision and
were not of such nature that employee could reasonably believe that employer intended to make him
offer of employment other than at-will.
[26] Labor and Employment 231H C=>40(3)
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term;
Employment At-Will
231Hk40(3) k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k3(2) Master and Servant)
Simply being informed that other employees could
not be terminated without just cause did not necessarily grant same right to employee.
[27) Labor and Employment 231H €=^47
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of
Contract. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k40(3.1) Master and Servant)
In order to prove that employment status was other
than at-will, employee had to point to affirmative
and definite acts of employer which demonstrated
employer's intent to modify its at-will contract with
employee.
*1308 Russell C. Fericks (Argued), Nathan R.
Hyde, Gerald J. Lallatin, Richards, Brandt, Miller
& Nelson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Labor and Employment 231H €=>40(3)
231H Labor and Employment
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of Personnel, told Trembly that, as district manager,
he could not fire anyone at Mrs. Fields without just
cause.

City, for appellee.
Before BENCH, DAVIS and ORME, JJ.

OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
Plaintiff Joe D. Trembly appeals the trial court's
consideration of defendant Mrs. Fields Cookies's
(Mrs. Fields) motion for relief from an earlier denial of Mrs. Fields's motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion and, pursuant to
the relief requested, granted summary judgment in
favor of Mrs. Fields, concluding that the undisputed
facts established as a matter of law that Trembly
was an at-will employee of Mrs. Fields. We affirm.

FACTS
Trembly was employed with Mrs. Fields in both
staff and managerial positions from November 26,
1986 until his termination on March 13, 1990.
When Trembly applied for *1309 a position with
Mrs. Fields, he signed an application for employment, at the top of which was the declaration that
"[a]ll employees of [Mrs. Fields] are 'at-will' employees subject to termination at anytime [sic] with
or without cause." Immediately above Trembly's
signature on the application is the statement "I
[Trembly] understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and may ... be terminated at any time without any previous notice."
Several oral statements were made to Trembly concerning Mrs. Fields's disciplinary and termination
policies. During Trembly's initial interview with
Mitchell Dorin, Mrs. Fields's Regional Director of
Operations, Dorin informed Trembly that he
(Trembly) would be allowed "X amount of mistakes" and that certain stages of discipline would be
followed before he would be "disciplined"
(terminated). Later in Trembly's employment with
Mrs. Fields, Cindy Reisner, Mrs. Fields's Director

In training videos, Randy Fields, Mrs. Fields's
Chairman, stated that Mrs. Fields treats its people
fairly and that a Mrs. Fields employee "will not be
terminated for things unless they've been ... completely investigated fairly." Randy Fields also said
that "the values of the company were more important than the training manual and that first and foremost is fair treatment of employees." The training
videos were intended for all employees.
During Trembly's tenure at Mrs. Fields, a policy
and procedure manual was in place. The policy and
procedure manual was replete with references to the
at-will nature of each individual's employment
status. In November 1989, an Employee Handbook
(handbook) was distributed, which, by its terms, superseded all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and
procedures issued by Mrs. Fields. The handbook
was distributed after the oral statements were made
to Trembly by Dorin and Reisner, and after the
Randy Fields's video was distributed.
The handbook provides:
This handbook is provided as a guide which you
may use to familiarize yourself with [Mrs. Fields].
It is provided and is intended only as a helpful
guide. It does not constitute, nor should it be construed to constitute an agreement or contract of employment, express or implied, or as a promise of
treatment in any particular manner in any given
situation. This handbook states only general [Mrs.
Fields's] guidelines.
The handbook's disciplinary process includes the
following reservation:
[Mrs. Fields] is an "at-will" employer which means
that any and all team members are subject to termination at anytime [sic] with or without cause. Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are an at-will employer,™1 [Mrs.
Fields] reserves the right to terminate a team mem-
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ber immediately.
FN1. Although this statement arguably
represents a misunderstanding of law, we
believe the intent of the handbook is clear
and that it is likely the comma was inadvertently placed after the word "employer"
rather than after the word "process/*
The handbook further states that Mrs. Fields will
"generally follow[ ] a progressive discipline policy
that involves four stages": a verbal discussion, a
written statement outlining an employee's required
performance, a written statement of consequences if
an employee is not performing as required, and an
execution of the consequences. The handbook then
provides a list of "grounds for immediate termination." Immediately following this list is the declaration that "[Mrs. Fields] is an at-will employer," that
the list provided should not be "construed as a
promise of specific treatment in a given situation,"
and that "[Mrs. Fields] is free to terminate an employee's employment at any time with or without
cause."
Trembly testified in his deposition that he had used
this particular handbook for training a store manager and had specifically talked about the at-will
language contained in the handbook. Trembly further testified that he understood that Mrs. Fields
utilized an at-will employment policy and believed
his *1310 employment relationship with Mrs.
Fields to be "at-will."

Mrs. Fields filed a motion to dismiss Trembly's
third cause of action, which was granted by thenpresiding Judge Frank G. Noel. Mrs. Fields subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of Trembly's remaining causes of
action. The trial court, through Judge Homer F.
Wilkinson, granted
summary judgment
on
Trembly's fourth and fifth causes of action, but
denied summary judgment on Trembly's first and
second claims.
Mrs. Fields filed a motion for reconsideration of
Judge Wilkinson's denial of summary judgment
with respect to Trembly's first and second causes of
action. Judge Wilkinson partially granted the motion, dismissing count two of Trembly's complaint,
but leaving intact Trembly's implied-in-fact employment contract claim. Mrs. Fields subsequently
filed a motion for relief from that order, basing it
upon the then recent Utah Supreme Court decisions
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303
(Utah 1992), and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844
P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). Judge David S. Young, who
had rotated into the court replacing Judge Wilkinson, granted the motion for relief and rendered
summary judgment in Mrs. Fields's favor on the
grounds that the holdings in Sanderson and Hodgson and the undisputed facts established, as a matter of law, that Trembly's "employment relationship
with [Mrs. Fields] was 'at-will.' "
Trembly appeals.

ISSUES
Mrs. Fields terminated Trembly on March 13, 1990.
Trembly filed suit against Mrs. Fields, asserting
five causes of action: (1) breach of implied-in-fact
employment contract; (2) breach of written contract; (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (4) misrepresentation; and (5) intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Trembly filed his
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court in
Summit County, which operates on a rotating trial
judge calendar.
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whether Trembly had an implied-in-fact employment contract providing he would be terminated
only for cause and, accordingly, whether summary
judgment was improper.
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ANALYSIS
[1][2][3][4] Trembly claims that Judge Young erred
in hearing Mrs. Fields's motion ¥H2 because no
new facts were presented and because entertaining
the motion violated the "law of the case" doctrine.
The decision to entertain a motion under Rule 54(b)
is a question of law. " 'We accord conclusions of
law no particular deference, but review them for
correctness.* " Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App.1991) (quoting
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985)).
FN2. Mrs. Fields brought its motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, by its terms,
Rule 60(b)(7) applies only to motions for
relief from a final judgment or order. Utah
R.Civ.P. 60(b). But see Rees v. Albertson's,
Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Utah 1978)
(suggesting in dicta that Rule 60(b)(7) is
appropriate mechanism to request reconsideration of earlier denial of motion for
summary judgment). In this case, Mrs.
Fields was asking the court to reconsider
the denial of a motion for summary judgment, which is not a final order or judgment. Thus, a motion under Rule 60(b)(7)
is not available. Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, allows
a court to change its position with respect
to any order or decision before a final
judgment has been rendered in the case.
See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,
1184-85 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45
(Utah App.1988). Because the substance,
not caption, of a motion is dispositive in
determining the character of the motion,
see State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044
(Utah App.1994), we will treat Mrs.
Fields's motion as a Rule 54(b) motion.

any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties ... is *1311 subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Id. Rule 54(b) allows "for the possibility of a judge
changing his or her mind in cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims." Salt Lake City
Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah
App.1988). Thus, a motion under Rule 54(b) is a
proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment. Timm
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993);
James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 44 & n. 5.
[7] A court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling.
These may include, but are not limited to, when (1)
the matter is presented in a "different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has been a
change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a
court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue
was inadequately briefed when first contemplated
by the court. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
[8] Mrs. Fields based its motion on Sanderson v.
First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), and
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah
1992), which the supreme court decided after Judge
Wilkinson denied Mrs. Fields's motion for summary judgment on Trembly's implied-in-fact contract claim. Mrs. Fields apparently believed that
these decisions presented the case at bar in a different light because of the factual similarities,™3 and
because the Utah Supreme Court in Hodgson held
that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment. Judge Young
agreed, stating that "if this were my case and I had
handled it throughout, I would have called it back

[5][6] Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that
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with the additional cases [Sanderson and Hodgson ]
and would have ruled consistent with what I have
now done " Judge Young therefore relied on proper
grounds for reconsidering the ruling previously
made by Judge Wilkinson
FN3 The plaintiff m Hodgson also relied
on statements made to her by her supervisor in a preemployment interview and
the disciplinary treatment of other employees to support her implied-in-fact contract
claim
[9][10][11][12][13][14] Trembly's next contention
of error is that the trial court heard Mrs Fields's
motion in violation of the "law of the case" doctrine, which provides that "one district court judge
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal
authority" Mascaro v Davis, 741 P2d 938, 946
(Utah 1987) This doctrine has "evolved to avoid
the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge
is presented with an issue identical to one which
has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge
in the same case" Id at 947 (footnote omitted)
Notwithstanding the law of the case doctrine, " 'a
trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents ' " James Constructors, 761 P2d at 45
(quotation omitted) "[T]he law of the case doctrine
does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake
and fixing it" Gdlmor v Wright, 850 P 2d 431, 439
(Utah 1993) (Orme, J, concurring) Moreover, a
judge is free to change a ruling until a final decision is formally rendered Utah R Civ P 54(b),
Ron Shepherd Ins v Shields, 882 P 2d 650, 652-54
(Utah 1994), McKee v Williams, 741 P 2d 978, 981
(Utah App 1987), cf Richardson v Grand Central
Corp, 572 P 2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) ("[Generally
preliminary or interim rulings do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or stare decisis ") In this case,
the denial of the motion for summary judgment was
not a final order Thus, the law of the case doctrine
did not preclude Judge Young from revisiting Judge
Wilkinson's prior rulingFN4
FN4 The fact that Judge Young replaced
Judge Wilkinson is of no significance A

smgle judge is entitled to correct any interim order previously made, and even though
a location within a judicial district is on a
rotating judge calendar, the authority of the
judge who actually decides the case on the
merits to correct a previously entered order
is undiminished On a rotating calendar,
"[i]n a sense, the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office for law of the case purposes " Gdlmor
v Wright, 850 P 2d 431, 439-40 (Utah
1993) (Orme, J , concurring)
*1312 [15] Because we hold that the trial court did
not err m entertaining Mrs Fields's motion, we
must next determine whether the trial court properly granted the motion It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a motion under
Rule 54(b), and the decision to do so will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of this discretion State v Smith, 781 P 2d 879, 882 n 4 (Utah
App 1989)
[16] After reviewing the record and the holdings in
Sanderson and Hodgson, we cannot say that Judge
Young abused his discretion by granting Mrs
Fields's motion for relief Judge Young based his
decision on Sanderson and Hodgson, which were
decided after Judge Wilkinson denied summary
judgment on Trembly's implied-in-fact contract
claim Sanderson considered issues similar to those
raised in the case at bar, the facts m Hodgson are
analogous to the facts in this case,FN5 with the
Utah Supreme Court holding that the plaintiffs
evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment On this basis, Mrs Fields's motion under
Rule 54(b) justified relief, and we decline to reverse Judge Young's decision to grant the motion
FN5 See discussion, footnote 2
[17][18][19] We now address the last issue raised
by Trembly whether the trial court erred m granting summary judgment m favor of Mrs Fields
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 306. Whether summary
judgment was appropriate is a question of law and
we grant no deference to the trial court's decision,
but review it for correctness. Richins, 817 P.2d at
385. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we liberally construe all inferences that may
be reasonably drawn from the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.,
818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). Although the existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract
is normally a question of fact left to the discretion
of the jury, "the court retains the power to decide
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could
find that an implied contract exists." Sanderson,
844 P.2d at 306. "If a reasonable jury cannot find
that an implied contract exists, summary judgment
is appropriate." Id. (citations omitted).
[20] Thus, we must determine whether there is a
dispute of material fact as to whether Trembly had
an implied-in-fact employment contract with Mrs.
Fields where Trembly would be terminated only
after certain disciplinary procedures were followed.
Trembly claims that the verbal assertions made to
him and language contained in the company policy
and procedures manual created an implied-in-fact
employment contract where he could be terminated
only after certain disciplinary procedures were followed, even though the subsequent handbook contained disclaimers dismissing any possibility of a
contract of employment other than at-will.
[21] In Johnson, the supreme court stated that in order for an
implied-in-fact contract term to exist, it must meet
the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract. There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee
and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract
provision [so that] the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making an offer of employment other than employment at will.
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted).

While it is clear that evidence of oral statements
standing alone may establish an implied-in-fact
contract, Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 334, such evidence
"must be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a
unilateral offer." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002.
[22][23][24] Trembly claims that the statements
made to him by Mitchell Dorin are sufficiently definite to operate as a "contract provision." However,
even if we agree with Trembly, if an employee has
knowledge of a distributed handbook that changes a
condition of the employee's employment, and the
employee remains in the company's employ, the
modified conditions become part of the employee's
employment contract. Id.; see also *1313Sorenson
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,
1148 (Utah App.1994) (earlier version of company's code of conduct arguably modifying employee's at-will status was expressly superseded by later
version). Further,
"[i]n this manner, an original employment contract
may be modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract. The employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a
unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job,
although free to leave, the employment supplies the
necessary consideration for the offer."
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (quoting Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627
(Minn. 1983)). Thus, even if Dorin's oral assertions
to Trembly modified his at-will status with Mrs.
Fields, the handbook clearly superseded and replaced that agreement. In the handbook, Mrs. Fields
unequivocally reserved its at-will employer status
and the right to terminate an employee at any time
with or without cause. Trembly testified that he was
familiar with this at-will language. Therefore,
Trembly could not have reasonably concluded, after
distribution of the handbook, that his employment
was other than at-will on the basis of Dorin's statements. Mrs. Fields eliminated any confusion regarding employment status by the clear and conspicuous disclaimers contained in the handbook,
which was distributed after Dorin made his com-
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ments to Trembly. Trembly retained his employment with Mrs. Fields with full knowledge of the
modified condition of his employment and his retention constituted his acceptance of Mrs. Fields's
offer: to remain employed at Mrs. Fields as an atwill employee.

the handbook, which stated "[t]his handbook supersedes all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and
procedures issued by the Company." Thus, we reject Trembly's reliance on this manual.

CONCLUSION
[25] Trembly's reliance on oral statements made by
Randy Fields and Cindy Reisner is also misplaced.
Trembly claims that Randy Fields's statements to
employees in company videos regarding fairness
modified Trembly's at-will employment status to
one where he could be terminated only for cause.
Not only does this argument fail because Trembly
saw the video before the handbook was distributed,
but also because general statements of fairness
made to all company employees through a training
video are not sufficiently definite to operate as a
contract provision and are not of such a nature that
Trembly could reasonably believe that Mrs. Fields
intended to make him an offer of employment other
than at-will. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002.

Judge Young properly heard Mrs. Fields's motion
for relief brought pursuant to Rule 54(b), and did
not abuse his discretion in granting that motion.
Summary judgment was correct because, as a matter of law, even if Trembly's initial employment
contract provided that he would be terminated only
after Mrs. Fields followed certain disciplinary procedures, this employment status was later modified
by the handbook, which provided that Trembly was
an at-will employee. Trembly accepted this contract
provision by *1314 remaining in Mrs. Fields's employ after he had knowledge of the company's atwill employment policy. Accordingly, we affirm.
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur.

[26] [27] Reisner informed Trembly that he could
not terminate any Mrs. Fields's employee without
just cause and, based on this assertion, Trembly
claims his at-will status was modified. As with the
statements made by Dorin and Randy Fields, Reisner's disclosure was made before the handbook was
distributed and was, therefore, of no consequence to
Trembly. Further, simply being informed that other
employees could not be terminated without just
cause does not necessarily grant the same right to
Trembly. Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1148; accord
Kirberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah
App.1994). Trembly is required to "point to affirmative and definite acts of [Mrs. Fields] demonstrating [Mrs. Fields's] intent to modify its at-will contract with [Trembly]." Kirberg, 872 P.2d at 42. This
he is unable to do.

Utah App., 1994.
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies
884 P.2d 1306
END OF DOCUMENT

Lastly, Trembly relies on language in the policy
and procedure manual to support his claim that he
could be terminated only after Mrs. Fields followed
certain disciplinary procedures. However, the
policy and procedures manual was superseded by

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

TabE

Westlaw.
Page 1

454 P.2d 886
22 Utah 2d 433,454 P.2d 886, 6 UCC Rep.Serv. 765
(Cite as: 22 Utah 2d 433,454 P.2d 886)

c
Supreme Court of Utah.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. Cordell Lundahl et
al., Defendants and Appellant.
No, 11359.

8k26 Evidence
8k26(3) k. Sufficiency. Most Cited Cases
Evidence sustained finding that settlement agreement which was entered into between bank and depositors at time of closing of sale of depositors'
business to third party constituted an accord and
satisfaction and discharged depositors from any liability on check which had previously been forwarded by bank to drawee bank for collection.

May 20, 1969.
[3J Trial 388 €=^362
Action by bank against depositors to recover for
dishonored check. The First District Court, Cache
County, Lewis Jones, J., found for bank and depositors appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C.J.,
held that where jury found that bank had not notified depositors of dishonor of check and that agreement executed by bank and depositors at time of
sale of depositors' business to third party constituted accord and satisfaction, trial judge improperly
allowed bank to recover on check.
Reversed.

388 Trial
388IX Verdict
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings
388k362 k. Amendment or Correction of
Findings. Most Cited Cases
Where case is submitted to jury on special verdicts,
trial court may make corrections of obvious errors
and may make additional findings but may not
make findings inconsistent with jury's determination.

Henriod, J., dissented.

[4] Accord and Satisfaction 8 €>=>23

West Headnotes
[1] Banks and Banking 52 €==>171(5)
52 Banks and Banking
52III Functions and Dealings
52111(D) Collections
52k 171 Failure to Collect
52kl71(5) k. Duty to Give Notice of
Nonacceptance or Nonpayment. Most Cited Cases
Bank which failed to give notice to its depositor of
dishonor of check was responsible for resulting
loss.
U.C.A.1953,
§§
70A-4-104(l)
(h),
70A-4-201(l), 70A-4-212, 70A-4-212(l).

8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k23 k. Operation and Effect of Satisfaction.
Most Cited Cases
Where jury found that bank had not notified depositor of dishonor of check and that agreement executed between bank and depositors at time of sale
of depositors' business to third party constituted accord and satisfaction, trial judge improperly allowed bank to recover on check.
**887 *433 Walter G. Mann, Reed W. Hadfield,
Richard F. Gordon, Brigham City, for appellant.
Chas. P. Olson, of Olson & Hoggan, Logan, Don B.
Allen, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

|2J Accord and Satisfaction 8 €=>26(3)
CROCKETT, Chief Justice.
8 Accord and Satisfaction
In this suit plaintiff First Security Bank contests
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with the defendants, the Lundahls, as to who bears
the loss on an $8100 check *434 which the
Lundahls had deposited with the plaintiff bank. The
plaintiff sent the check for collection, but it was
never paid. The Lundahls asserted two defenses: (1)
that because the bank negligently failed to give notice as required by the commercial code, it lost the
right to charge it back to defendants' account, and
(2) that there was an accord and satisfaction with
respect to it.
When the check was dishonored by the payor bank,
First Security Bank charged back the check against
the defendants' account, obtaining the $893.93 in
the account at the time and creating an 'overdraft'
of $7206.07. Although a jury answered interrogatories favorable to defendants on the issues of failure to give notice and accord and satisfaction, the
trial court, on the basis of 'further findings,'
rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $7206.07.
Defendants were awarded $893.93 as an offset on
their counterclaim. Defendants appeal.
Wherever there is dispute, it is our duty on review
to accept as fact that evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom which supports
the jury verdict. [FN 1]
FN1. Niemann v. Grand Central Market,
Inc., 9 Utah 2d 46, 337 P.2d 424 (1959).
In July, 1966, the corporate defendant, a manufacturer of farm machinery in Logan, Utah, sold several pieces of equipment to Heathfield Equipment,
Ltd., of Kamloops, British Columbia. One of the
checks received by defendants as payment for the
equipment was for $8121.88. This check was deposited in the plaintiff bank on July 28, 1966. It
was sent to the Royal Bank of Canada for payment,
but it was there dishonored. The check was returned
to Logan and the plaintiff bank charged back the
amount of the check to the defendants' account. At
about this time, however, and for reasons not important here, the check was lost and the Lundahls
were required to obtain a second check from Heathfield to replace it.

The second check was received on November 15,
1966, and was deposited with plaintiff bank to
Lundahls' account on December 5, 1966. By a letter
dated December 9, 1966, the Canadian bank gave
notice to First Security of insufficient funds to pay
the check, but that it would be held for payment unless otherwise instructed. However, according to
the jury's finding, First Security did not then give
notice of dishonor to the defendants.
Meanwhile, the Lundahls had been negotiating with
a Hesston Corporation to sell their business and had
entered into a contract to do so on July 29, 1966.
The provisions of interest here are that by December 1, 1966, Hesston would deposit with the
plaintiff, in escrow, $187,000 to be held for certain
specified dispositions for the benefit of the
Lundahls, including the payment of their debts, and
that by January 1, 1967, *435 Lundahls were to
'fully pay, satisfy or obtain release of all debts,
wages, accounts, taxes, liabilities' owed by or outstanding against them. It is pertinent to note that
plaintiff First Security Bank had a copy of this
since it was acting as the escrow agent.
On January 4, 1967, the Lundahls met with representatives of Hesston and plaintiff bank to complete
the transaction. At this meeting, defendants were in
possession **888 of a letter from the plaintiff bank
setting out all their direct obligations, a total of
$75,648.73, and another letter setting out their contingent obligations as $2892.87. But no mention
was made in either letter of the $100 check, which
the bank knew had not been paid. In accordance
with the letters, the Lundahls caused the total of the
two amounts shown in the letters, $78,402.55 of the
escrow money, to be paid to the bank. Ezra C.
Lundahl and E. Cordell Lundahl testified that after
this amount was paid they asked for the return of
their guaranty, which had been entered into in May,
1964, by the individual defendants for the Lundahl
corporation accounts. They testified that the parties
agreed that it was to be returned later with other papers.
It was about a month and a half later, by a letter

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 3

454 P.2d 886
22 Utah 2d 433,454 P.2d 886, 6 UCC Rep.Serv. 765
(Cite as: 22 Utah 2d 433,454 P.2d 886)
dated February 16, 1967, that the Royal Bank of
Canada returned the $8100 check to the plaintiff
bank; and on February 20, 1967, the latter charged
that check to the Lundahl account, creating the
Overdraft' therein of $7206.07. The Lundahls
questioned the bank's right to do so, and that is the
pivotal question in this case.
[1] The plaintiffs contention is that it had accepted
the check in question as an agent for collection
only, and that it took upon itself no liability as the
owner of the check. It is true that under the Uniform Commercial Code there is a presumption that
a collecting bank acts as agent for its depositor.
Sec. 70A-4-201(l), U.C.A.1953. However, this presupposes that the bank acts in accordance with its
duty imposed by law; and this requires presentation
to the payor bank in the due course of business,
and, if the check is dishonored, notice to its depositor 'by its midnight deadline [FN2] or within a
longer reasonable time' under the circumstances.
Sec. 70A-4-212(l), U.C.A.1953. If there is a substantial failure of the bank to perform this duty, it
loses its right of charge-back. Sec. 70A-4-212,
U.C.A.1953. The issue with respect to this duty was
found against the plaintiff by the jury's answer to an
interrogatory that:
FN2. The "Midnight deadline* with respect
to a bank is midnight on its next banking
day following the banking day on which it
receives the relevant item or notice or from
which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later.' Sec.
70A-4-104(l)(h), U.C.A.1953.
We find the Bank was negligent because they failed
to notify Lundahls Inc. in the time prescribed by
law, or a reasonable*436 time, about the second
check not being honored by the Royal Bank of
Canada.
This failure of the plaintiff bank to discharge its
duty prescribed by the statutes discussed above
makes it responsible for the resulting loss. Evidence
was presented to the effect that with the passage of
time conditions of the Heathfield Company

changed substantially, and that if timely notice had
been given, there would have been no loss due to its
insolvency.
The resolution of the issue on accord and satisfaction by the jury also supports the position of the defendants so plainly that it is hardly susceptible of
misunderstanding. Interrogatory No. 4 asked them:
Was there a complete accord and satisfaction
between the parties on or about January 4, 1967,
whereby all accounts were settled and compromised
between the parties, including a promise, if any you
find, on the part of the bank to surrender up the
written guaranty?
To this the jury answered:
We the jury, agree on the first part of question No.
4. There was complete accord and satisfaction
between the parties on January 4, 1967. We find
that the guaranty was included in said agreement.
[2] It is the Lundahls' position and testimony that
the various amounts to be paid to the bank were
discussed, particularly that a reference was made to
the $8121.88 obligation, that as a result of their discussion of it, the interest on that item **889 was
waived, and that the amounts referred to above,
totaling $78,402.55, were to discharge all of their
liabilities, direct and contingent, including the obligation in controversy. Even though the evidence
may be susceptible of a different conclusion, as
plaintiff argues, it is also reasonably supportive of
the finding made by the jury that 'all accounts were
settled and compromised between the parties.'
The difficulty which exists in this case is that, notwithstanding the findings of the jury in favor of defendants as set forth above, which the trial court
stated that he 'accepted,' 'approved' and found
'true and correct,' he nevertheless awarded the
plaintiff credit for the amount of the check. This
was done on the basis of the court's 'further finding' that the defendants knew or should have
known of Heathfield's financial instability and, in
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addition, that they were kept fully informed of the
plaintiff bank's continuing efforts to collect the
check.
[3] The effect of this 'further finding' was actually
to contravene the finding made by the jury that the
plaintiff bank 'was negligent because it failed to
give Lundahls notice in the time prescribed by law,
or a reasonable time, about the second *437 check
not being honored by the Royal Bank of Canada.'
The same observation is pertinent to the action of
the trial court with respect to the issue of accord
and satisfaction. Notwithstanding what we have delineated above, the trial court made the 'further
finding' that the $8100 check 'was specifically
omitted from said settlement * * V It is recognized
that where a case is submitted to the jury on special
verdicts, the trial court may make corrections of obvious errors or defects therein, and he may make
additional findings on issues which have not been
submitted to the jury, but are necessary to settle the
issues involved.[FN3] But when a party has demanded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury
find the facts, and it is not the trial court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and
thereby defeat the effect of the jury's findings.
FN3. See 53 Am.Jur. Trial s 1094.
[4 J In consonance with the jury's answers to the interrogatories and what we have said above, that part
of the trial court's judgment allowing the plaintiff
bank to charge the $8100 check against the defendants is reversed; and the judgment awarded defendants for $893.93 on their counterclaim is affirmed.
Costs to defendants (appellants).
CALLISTER, TUCKETT, and ELLETT, JJ., concur.
HENRIOD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although this case is
cluttered up with numerous facts, some of a confusing or contradictory character, nonetheless there are
a few that are not disputed and which appear to me
to be quite simple and decisive, all in harmony with
the trial court's judgment.
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The only question in this case is whether a check
for about $8100 made payable to defendant
Lundahl, endorsed and deposited by Lundahl, with
a condition imposed by Lundahl that it was for collection only, places an absolute liability on the bank
to collect the amount from the maker's bank, in
spite of hell and high water, failing which, the bank
an obvious agent of Lundahl, becomes, not an agent
any more, but an unnamed surety without consideration. All this because of a claim of lack of notice
of dishonor under some real or ethereal code provision that apparently has nothing to do with a
'deposit for collection only.' I think that the question should be resolved in favor of the trial court's
conclusion that under the facts of this case the bank
is not legally liable to contribute its own money for
the claimed 'loss' of money, that was not lost at all.
Lundahl still has a claim for it against the maker,
and if the amount is paid by the latter, whose obligation it is, obviously it would result in an unjust enrichment**890 if plaintiff also paid. The circumstances*438 that Lundahl did not or could not pursue the obligor should be no reason why a mere
agent depositee for collection should transmute a
primary obligation into a suretyship relationship
sans any consensual aspect.
It might be noted that although the main opinion attributes liability to the plaintiff bank because of the
check's dishonor by a foreign bank and First Security's failure to give notice thereof,-that conclusion
is not quite true under the circumstances of this
case. The foreign bank simply notified First Security that there were insufficient funds presently to
pay the check but that it would be held for later
payment unless otherwise advised. In such case
First Security persisted in being Lundahl's agent for
collection only, as is reflected in the bank's elimination of interest.
I am unimpressed by the stresses and strains indulged in argument anent the prerogative of the
judge as opposed to those of the jury under a rule
whose clarity, I would venture, has been unclarified
and explained by not one, but many judicial inter-
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pretations, as is reflected in the annotations of both
the state and federal rule, being 49(a) in both bailiwicks.
The bank should be protected against an unjust enrichment (Restatement, Restitution, Sec. 1, Unjust
Enrichment), particularly since there is nothing inimical in the Commercial Code with respect to such
protection.
There was no such thing as an accord and satisfaction in this case with respect to the check in question. The check simply was being held by an agent,
for the purpose of collection only. Had this agent
(the bank) collected on the check, but had not paid
the proceeds over, the proceeds then may well have
become an item includable in a true accord and satisfaction atmosphere.
The trial court should be affirmed.
Utah 1969.
First Sec. Bank of Utah, Nat. Ass'n v. Ezra C.
Lundahl, Inc.
22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886, 6 UCC Rep.Serv. 765
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
MEL HARDMAN PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Dick ROBINSON and Adanac Film Productions,
Ltd., a corp., Defendants and Appellants,
v.
SUNN CLASSIC PICTURES, INC., a corp. and
John Does 1 through X, whose true names are unknown, Counterclaim Defendants and Respondents.
No. 16366.
Dec. 7,1979.
Corporation brought action to recover for breach of
defendants' contract to deliver "photoplay" about
person known for his association with wild animals.
Defendants counterclaimed against corporation's
subsidiary on theory that it breached its agreement
by failing to pay "residuals" after making movie
based on defendants' film and work. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J.,
denied any recovery to corporation on its complaint
and granted corporation judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the counterclaim, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held
that issue whether corporation or subsidiary had
distributed defendants' photoplay, within meaning
of the contract, was for jury and was properly submitted to it, and trial court erred in subsequently
concluding that defendants could not recover
merely because corporation and subsidiary did not
use any of the film produced by defendants.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
fll Estoppel 156 €=^52(5)
156 Estoppel
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General

156k52 Nature and Application of Estoppel in Pais
156k52(5) k. Application in General.
Most Cited Cases
It is not consistent with principles of justice and fair
dealing for one party to impose on another a requirement that something be done to such party's
satisfaction and then permit him to arbitrarily withhold his approval; equity and good conscience require that he act in good faith and prevent him from
stubbornly refusing to acknowledge satisfaction
without some reasonable justification for doing so.
12] Copyrights and Intellectual Property 99 0 = ^
109
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
9911 Intellectual Property
99kl09 k. Remedies. Most Cited Cases
In action in which corporation sought recovery for
breach of defendants' contract to deliver
"photoplay" and in which defendants counterclaimed against corporation's subsidiary on theory
that it breached its agreement by failing to pay
"residuals" after making movie based on defendants' film and work, issue whether corporation or
subsidiary had distributed defendants' photoplay,
within meaning of the contract, was for jury and
was properly submitted to it; trial court erred in
subsequently concluding that defendants could not
recover merely because corporation and subsidiary
did not use any of film produced by defendants.
[3] Jury 230 € = > 9
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k9 k. Nature and Scope in General. Most
Cited Cases
Right to trial by jury is one which should be carefully guarded by the courts.
HI Jury 230 €=>34(1)
230 Jury
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230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right
230k34 Restriction or Invasion of Functions of Jury
230k34(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 230k34(2))
Party who has demanded jury trial is entitled to
have benefit of jury's findings on issues of fact, and
it is not trial court's prerogative to disregard or nullify such findings by making findings of its own.
[51 Appeal and Error 30 €=^927(7)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most
Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 C=*934(l)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment 228 €==>199(3.2)
228 Judgment
228VI On Trial of Issues
228VI(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in
General
228kl99 Notwithstanding Verdict
228kl99(3.2) k. Evidence and Inferences That May Be Considered or Drawn. Most
Cited Cases
Judgment 228 €=>199(3.10)

228VI(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in
General
228k 199 Notwithstanding Verdict
228kl99(3.10) k. Where There Is No
Evidence to Sustain Verdict. Most Cited Cases
Trial 388 €=^139.1(7)
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VI(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in
General
388kl39.1 Evidence
388kl39.1(5) Submission to or Withdrawal from Jury
388kl39.1(7) k. "No" Evidence;
Total Failure of Proof. Most Cited Cases
Trial 388 €=^178
388 Trial
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury
388VI(D) Direction of Verdict
388kl78 k. Hearing and Determination.
Most Cited Cases
In ruling on motions which would take issues of
fact from jury, such as motions for directed verdict
and for judgment notwithstanding verdict, trial
court must look at the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom
in light most favorable to party moved against, and
granting of such a motion is justified only if, in so
viewing the evidence, there is no substantial basis
therein which would support a verdict in his favor;
on appeal, in considering trial court's granting of
such motions, Supreme Court looks at the evidence
in the same manner.
|6] Jury 230 C=>12(1)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k 12 Nature of Cause of Action or Issue in
General
230kl2(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

228 Judgment
228 VI On Trial of Issues

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

M. v * £ , v - r \JX KJ

Page 3
604 P 2d 913
(Cite as: 604 P.2d 913)
Issue in regard to damages is an issue on which
parties are entitled to a jury trial to same extent as
on other disputed issues of fact
*914 John S Adams of Gustin, Adams, Kastmg &
Liapis, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants
Peter W Billings and Anthony L Rampton, Salt
Lake City, for Mel Hardman Productions
Robert S Howell and Wesley G Howell, Jr, Salt
Lake City, for Sunn Classic Pictures

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
Plaintiff
Mel
Hardman
Productions,
Inc
(hereinafter Productions) sued defendant Dick
Robinson and his corporation, Adanac Film Productions, (hereinafter Robinson) for breach of contract for failing to deliver a nature motion picture
based on the life of one Grizzly Adams
Robmson denied that allegation and filed a counterclaim agamst Schick-Sunn Classic Pictures, Inc
(hereinafter Pictures), a subsidiary of Productions
Robinson alleges that he fully performed the contract, but that after he had delivered his film to Productions, the latter made a movie based upon his
idea, his film and his work, which was profitably
sold and distributed, and that Productions breached
its agreement when it refused to pay him the
"residuals" provided for in their agreement
At the close of the evidence after a five-week jury
trial, Productions and Pictures moved for directed
verdicts The trial court took those motions under
advisement and submitted written interrogatories to
the jury [FN1] After almost two days of deliberation, the jury returned its answers to the interrogatories They were favorable to Robinson's contentions that he had not committed any matenal
breach of his contract, and that, though he had not
completed all of his obligations thereunder, the
conduct of Productions constituted a waiver of his
failure to do so Similarly, as to the counterclaim,
the jury found that Productions or Pictures, its
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agent, had used and distributed Robinson's photoplay, as that term was used in the contract
FN1 Pursuant to Rule 49(a), U R C P
Both Productions and Pictures then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict The court adopted the jury's finding that Robmson had not materially breached the contract and denied Productions
any recovery on its complaint However,*915 the
court concluded that, smce neither Productions nor
Pictures distributed any of the actual film which
Robmson had produced and delivered to them, he
was "not entitled to any residuals or deferred compensation" The court therefore granted the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ruled
that Robmson should also not recover on his counterclaim He appeals
On July 24, 1973, Robinson and Productions
entered mto a Production Agreement whereby
Robinson was to produce a "photoplay" sufficient
to produce a feature-length motion picture about
one "Grizzly Adams," a histoncal character who
was known for his friendliness and association with
wild animals Under the agreement, Robinson was
to produce a photoplay "to the sole satisfaction" of
Productions "sufficient to produce a motion picture
of not less than ninety (90) mmutes in duration,
filmed on location in the wilds, tentatively entitled
'Grizzly Adams' based on and pursuant to a final
story and scnpt to be submitted" by Robinson, and
with him playmg the mam character
As payment therefor, Robmson was to receive
$150,000 in four installments, plus a percentage of
Productions' gross receipts from the sale, distribution, or other disposition of the photoplay or Productions' rights therein The amount he was to receive was subject to deductions provided for in a
distribution agreement between Productions and
Pictures, and any costs incurred in the distribution,
sale, or other disposition of the photoplay not otherwise to be deducted under that agreement
Robinson began filming in mid-August 1973 and
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delivered about 20 hours of film to Productions by
October 31, 1973. One month later, after it had paid
Robinson the $150,000, Productions hired one John
Mahon to assemble a preliminary film from the
footage that had been submitted by Robinson. After
Productions reviewed the film, they allegedly notified Robinson that the result was not satisfactory;
and advanced him another $35,000 to complete the
motion picture. The position of plaintiffs is that defendant still failed to deliver a satisfactory motion
picture; and in April 1974, this action was initiated
for the money it had paid him and for claimed loss
of profits because of his alleged breach of the
agreement.
On June 10, 1974, Productions employed one
Charles Sellier "to salvage the Grizzly Adams
project." He reviewed the film that Robinson had
submitted and he states that it was his opinion that,
due to the deficiencies in the film and Robinson's
lack of cooperation, it could not be used; and that
he proceeded to produce a different motion picture,
entitled "The Life and Times of Grizzly Adams,"
which contained none of the actual film which had
been produced by Robinson. This Sellier version of
the story was released in November 1974, and is
conceded to be a financial success. It was subsequently distributed to theaters throughout the
United States and foreign countries, and shown on
television. It was also the basis for a weekly television series which ran for over two years. In July of
1975, Robinson filed his counterclaim for percentages of the proceeds plaintiffs had realized from the
distribution of that film. Following extensive discovery procedures and after numerous pre-trial motions and conferences, the case came to trial on
January 8, 1979.
The position essayed by Productions and Pictures,
both in the trial court and on appeal, is that the intent of the term "photoplay," as used in the agreement, was restricted to the specific motion picture
on film (with sound and voice recording) actually
produced by Robinson, and to the satisfaction of
Productions. Whereas the position taken by the de-

fendant is that the meaning intended was more general, including the aggregate of the name, the general concept of the story, and the literary and work
product, which he fashioned into the Grizzly
Adams story, all of which he delivered to the
plaintiffs and which they made use of.
[1] We note our agreement with the thought that it
is simply not consistent with principles of justice
and fair dealing for one party to impose upon another a requirement that something be done to his
satisfaction and then arbitrarily withhold his approval. Equity and good conscience require*916
that he act in good faith, and prevent him from
stubbornly refusing to acknowledge satisfaction
without some reasonable justification for doing so.
[FN2]
FN2. Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d 66,
328 P.2d 307 (1958).
[2] In the course of the trial, the jury heard and saw
all of the evidence relating to those issues. This included the viewing of the Sellier version, which
was distributed, and a three-hour edited version of
the film which Robinson had produced and delivered to the plaintiffs.
The jury was given proper instructions as to the issues involved and the case was submitted to them
on special interrogatories. Instruction No. 18 was:
This case will be submitted to you in the form of a
Set of questions to answer Which will resolve the
factual issues in this case. After you have resolved
the factual questions, the court will determine how
your factual determinations apply to the legal issues
involved here.
As has been stated above, the jury answered the interrogatories generally favorable to the defendant,
and this included this pivotal question:
Did productions or its agent distribute Robinson's
photoplay as that term is used in the contract?
to which the jury answered "Yes.
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After the jury had returned its answers to the interrogatories, the trial court gave further consideration
to the plaintiffs motion for directed verdict and decided to grant it In doing so, he stated
In order for the court to determine whether or
not the finding as to the distribution of the
"photoplay" can stand the court has to ascertain
whether or not the Agreement
clearly defines
the term Robinson is only entitled to deferred compensation If his photoplay was distributed and box
office receipts obtained therefrom
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement is the only one that
attempts to define "photoplay" and it says that it
"shall be Deemed to mclude, (emphasis added by
the trial court) but not limited to, a motion picture
production consisting of 16mm Ektrachrome professional color reversal stock film complete to the
post-production stage produced and/or exhibited
with or accompanied by sound and voice recording
" This court concludes and holds that Since
neither Productions nor Pictures ever distributed
any of the film produced by Robmson, he is not entitled to any residuals nor deferred compensation
No matter what other parts of the agreement may
include items that may be included in the term
"photoplay" this definition requires that Part of it
must be the celluloid motion picture
In so
holding this court is fully aware of the rule that this
court should accept the jury verdict if there is any
evidence to support it (Citing cases )
It will be seen that, in so ruling, the trial court decided to disregard the findings of the jury and to
rule in favor of the plaintiff on the issues m dispute
as a matter of law It is our opinion that the court
erred in concluding that defendant Robinson could
not recover merely because plaintiffs did not use
any of the actual film produced by him
The agreement provides that the term photoplay
"shall be deemed to include, But not limited to, a
motion picture production consistmg of
film
complete to the post-production stage
" The

defimtion of "photoplay" contained in the contract
is an illustrative, but not an all-inclusive one From
a consideration of the circumstances surrounding
this contract, and the conduct of the parties with respect thereto, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the term "photoplay" is not necessarily
limited to the actual film produced by Robmson
The question as to what was mtended by the term
"photoplay" and whether Productions or Pictures
distributed Robinson's photoplay as that term was
mtended to mean in the contract, was a question
which the trial court had originally considered as a
question of fact, and submitted to the jury for determination In that regard, this Court has heretofore stated
*917 It is to be conceded that ordinarily the interpretation of the terms of a document is a question
of law for the court, but this is not necessarily true
m all situations Where, as here, it is made to appear that the terms may have a particularized application or meamng and there is room for uncertainty or disagreement
it was proper for the trial
court to regard this dispute as an issue of fact [FN3]

FN3 Universal Invest Co v Carpets, Inc,
16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P 2d 564, 566 (1965)
See also Timberlme Equip Co v St Paul
Fire & Marine Ins Co, 281 Or 639, 576
P 2d 1244 (1977)
There are numerous parts of the record which are
consistent with and support the court's initial treatment of the issue as being one of fact In a minute
entry dated July 1, 1977, in denymg Production's
motion for summary judgment against Robmson on
his counterclaim, the trial court stated
The court finds that There is ambiguity in the term
"Photoplay" m that the defimtion states it includes,
"but is not limited to" the 16mm film This dispute
permeates the whole transaction and leaves large issues of fact to be resolved
Similarly, in its pre-trial order of January 3, 1979,
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the court stated that one of the issues, both as to the
complaint and the counterclaim, was what was the
meaning of the term "photoplay" which was to be
delivered by Robinson, and further:
(3) Did Productions distribute Robinson's photoplay
or any substantial portion thereof Or a substantial
similarity thereto.
(Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein added.)
It will be seen from the several statements made by
the trial court in connection with his rulings that he
had consistently considered that the questions: as to
the meanings of "photoplay" as used in the contract, whether Robinson had breached the contract,
and whether his photoplay had been used and distributed, were questions of fact for the jury.
[3][4][5] As we have numerous times indicated, the
right of trial by jury is one which should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party
had demanded such a trial, he is entitled to have the
benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and it
is not the trial court's prerogative to disregard or
nullify them by making findings of his own.[FN4]
Therefore, in ruling on motions which take issues
of fact from the jury (this includes both motions for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict), the trial court is obliged to look at the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that fairly
may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to
the party moved against; [FN5] and the granting of
such a motion is justified only if, in so viewing the
evidence, there is no substantial basis therein which
would support a verdict in his favor.[FN6] On appeal, in considering the trial court's granting of such
motions, we look at the evidence in the same manner.[FN7]
FN4. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 18 Utah
2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966); First Sec.
Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d
443, 454 P.2d 886 (1969). See statements
in Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint,
122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952); Roche

v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855
(1953); Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Const. Co.,
29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973).
FN5. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967); Anderson v.
Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432
(1973); Winters v. W. S. Hatch Co., Inc.,
Utah, 546 P.2d 603 (1976).
FN6. Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422,
394 P.2d 77 (1964); Schow v. Guardtone,
Inc., supra, note 4; Koer v. Mayfair Markets, supra, note 5.
FN7. Winters v. W. S. Hatch Co., Inc.,
supra, note 5; McCloud v. Baum, Utah,
569 P.2d 1125 (1977).
In further accord with what has been said above,
and the conclusion we have reached, is the statement the trial court made to counsel after the jury
had been discharged: that he thought the jury had
examined the case very carefully. Moreover, in his
judgment on the special verdict, the court recited
that the jury "was most cooperative during the
course of the trial and by reason of the questions
submitted and requests made of the court during deliberations was one of the most conscientious juries
this court has observed."
*918 On the basis of our discussion herein, it is our
conclusion that the trial court was correct in his
previously expressed views as to the disputed issues; and also that the evidence justified submitting
those disputed issues to the jury. Accordingly, the
findings of the jury entitling the defendant to recover on his counterclaim should be reinstated.
[6] In view of our conclusion just stated, the question as to damages to be assessed becomes pertinent. On that subject we make these observations:
the parties submitted different calculations as to the
amounts of damages. When the matter of damages
is in dispute, it is an issue upon which the parties
are entitled to a jury trial, the same as on other dis-
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puted issues of fact. Consistent with what has been
said herein, the case is remanded for a determination as to the damages to be awarded on the defendant's counterclaim. Costs to defendant (appellant).
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, HALL and STEWART,
JJ., concur.
Utah, 1979.
Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson
604P.2d913
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